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Religious freedom is one type of human rights which caused major resistance to the universalism claim of 
human rights in Muslim countries. The resistance revealed that the universalism problems of human rights 
and the particularism challenges of local culture are real and actual, especially in religious freedom (freedom of 
religion or belief). This article attempted to describe why that resistance arose and how Islam should 
reconceptualize religious freedom. The religious freedom issues are important to be explored in the context of 
contemporary Islamic studies because its value and scope tended to be limited in the Islamic conservatism 
discourse. One of the issues is the fallacy in categorizing the apostasy (riddah)—a non-derogable right—
verdicted as a blasphemy in Islam. By reconceptualizing the Islamic meaning of religious freedom, this study 
applied document analysis to enrich the contemporary Islamist studies, especially to postulate the significant 
relationship between Islam and human rights and to argue that Islam actually legitimized religious freedom as 
one of the non-derogable rights. It began by describing; (a) the problem of universalism claim of human rights; 
(b) the resistance of the Islamic world to this claim, especially in the religious freedom issues; to then (c) 
reconceptualizing religious freedom in Islamic context which supposed to mediate two antagonistic sides 
between Islam and human rights. 
 
Abstrak 
Kebebasan beragama adalah salah satu jenis hak asasi manusia (HAM) yang telah memantik resistensi utama 
di negeri-negeri Muslim terhadap klaim universalisme HAM. Resistensi itu merefleksikan fakta bahwa 
problem universalisme HAM di hadapan partikularisme budaya lokal sungguh nyata dan selalu aktual, 
khususnya menyangkut hak kebebasan beragama dan berkeyakinan. Artikel ini berupaya menggambarkan 
mengapa resistensi itu muncul dan bagaimana Islam seharusnya mengkonseptualisasi ulang kebebasan 
beragama. Isu-isu kebebasan beragama sangat penting untuk dieksplorasi dalam konteks studi Islam 
kontemporer karena nilai dan lingkupnya cenderung terbatas dalam wacana Islam konservatif. Salah satu isu 
terpenting ialah kekeliruan mengkategorisasi apostasi (riddah)—suatu jenis hak yang tidak dapat dikurangi 
dalam keadaan apa pun—sebagai bentuk penistaan agama dalam Islam. Dalam mengkonsep ulang makna 
kebebasan beragama dalam Islam, studi ini menerapkan analisis dokumen untuk memperkaya kajian Islam 
kontemporer, terutama untuk menguatkan relasi signifikan antara Islam dan HAM sekaligus menegaskan 
bahwa Islam pada dasarnya melegitimasi kebebasan beragama sebagai salah satu jenis HAM yang tidak boleh 
dibatasi dalam situasi apa pun. Pemaparan dimulai dengan menggambarkan (a) problem klaim universalisme 
HAM; (b) resistensi dunia Islam terhadap klaim tersebut, khususnya dalam isu kebebasan beragama; dan 
kemudian (c) mengkonsep ulang kebebasan beragama dalam konteks Islam dengan pemaknaan yang 
diandaikan dapat memediasi sisi-sisi antagonistik antara Islam dan HAM.      
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Introduction 
Human rights are the long process product 
of Western civilization. Therefore, it is 
reasonable if a number of tensions between 
universalism claim of human rights and 
particularism of local culture in the non-
Western world, including the Islamic world. 
These conflicts indicated resistances to the 
universalism claim of human rights, so a 
compromise is need to affirm the strengthening 
of human rights without negating the 
particularity of local cultures. 
Human rights discourse inevitably linked 
with the dynamics of Western civilization.1 
Socio-political dynamics in the Western world 
and philosophers’ reflections had important 
effects on the development of human rights 
discourse in later periods.2 In the early half of 
the twentieth century, human rights formulation 
was considered to be no longer sufficient to 
accommodate the socio-economic-political 
dynamics of the world, especially after World 
War I and II that triggered many human rights 
violations in various parts of the world.  
This fact had prompted conceptualization 
efforts on human rights. In the post-World War 
I period, i.e. during the formation of the League 
of Nations, the conception of human rights 
began to be institutionalized. Several treaties 
and declarations were agreed by a number of 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe which 
contained guarantees of non-discrimination in 
                                                 
 1Jan Erik Wetzel, “Introduction,” in The EU as a ‘Global 
Player’ in Human Rights?, ed. Jan Erik Wetzel (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 1-13. 
 2Antonio Cassese, Hak Asasi Manusia di Dunia yang 
Berubah, trans. A. Rahman Zainuddin (Jakarta: Yayasan 
Obor Indonesia, 2005), 31; Andrew Fagan, "Human 
Rights", The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 
February 25, 2020, http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-
rts/htm.; A. Patra M. Zen, “Berkenalan dengan Instrumen-
instrumen Internasional dan Regional Hak Asasi 
Manusia,” in Instrumen Internasional Pokok Hak Asasi 
Manusia, ed. Adnan Buyung Nasution and A. Patra M. Zen 
(Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, YLBHI, Kelompok Kerja 
Ake Arif, 2006), 4-81. 
human rights, including freedom of religion or 
belief.3 
Since then, the ideas about human rights 
emerged and further enriched the discourse. 
One of the famous ideas was the four main 
foundations of human rights by US President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945), namely 
freedom of speech and expression, freedom 
from want, freedom from fear, and freedom of 
religion.4 His ideas inspired the member states 
of the United Nations (UN) to formulate the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) in 1948. 
The UDHR was a new starting point for the 
development of human rights in the 
international context.5 Its effects triggered 
stronger awareness of the urgency of protecting 
human rights. It inspired the emergence of 
human rights documents within the UN and 
encouraged the emergence of human rights 
declarations within the European Union, 
Council of Europe, the Organization of 
American States, the Organization of African 
Unity, and the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.6 
In 1966, exactly 18 years after the UDHR 
declared, the UN tried to provide certainty in 
protecting human rights in various aspects of 
social, political, economic, and cultural life. Two 
covenants were launched in the UN General 
Assembly on December 16, 1966 to ensure the 
conducive protection of human rights in the 
public life. They were the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).7 
                                                 
 3Zen, “Berkenalan...”, 6.  
 4“The Four Freedoms,” accessed March 7, 2020, 
http://www.libertynet.org/edcivic/fdr.html  
 5“Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” accessed 
March 25, 2020, http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.  
 6The human rights documents and protocols that 
emerged after 1948, see the Appendices section of Tore 
Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, Jr., and Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie, 
eds., Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook 
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004), 871-
921. 
 7Lindholm, Facilitating, 971-921.  
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These historical facts confirmed that the 
history of human rights is the history of Western 
civilization. As a public discourse, human rights 
emerged in the West and accompanied the 
socio-political-economic-cultural dynamics of 
the West for centuries. Most documents about 
human rights also arose in the Western world 
civilization than in other parts of the world. 
Therefore, the influence of Western cultures was 
quite significant on the UDHR 1948 and also on 
the other international human rights covenants. 
In other words, UDHR was a product of an era 
(1940s) which dominated by "Western 
countries" and reflected a "Western" concept of 
human rights. 
The Western concept of human rights had 
caused problems and provoked resistances 
when applied in non-Western civilization, 
especially the claim of universalism. The claim 
viewed that human rights are the universal 
consensus that can be applied in all spaces and 
times while overcoming all disparities of 
cultures, ideologies, moralities, and religions. 
The claim believed that its values are always 
true in any situation and condition and relevant 
across cultures and histories. The claim is 
problematic indeed because there are always a 
number of disparities and particularities, 
especially concerning philosophical, religious, 
and cultural traditions in the world.8  
As a result, the spread of universal human 
rights around the world had raised resistances 
of non-Western countries, including Muslim 
countries of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC).9 The resistances in general 
laid on the theses that human rights are not 
universally applicable because different cultures 
have their own standards and principles so that 
the implementation of universal human rights 
in all countries is clearly impossible.10 The theses 
were also promulgated by the human rights 
                                                 
 8Cassese, Hak Asasi, 71-96.  
 9John Kelsay and Sumner B. Twiss, eds., Agama dan 
Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia, trans. Ahmad Suaedy and Elga 
Sarapung (Yogyakarta: Institut Dian/Interfidei, 2007), 57-8. 
 10Cassese, Hak Asasi, 71-96. 
defenders, religious leaders, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). These 
communities recognizing that there are conflicts 
between universalism claim of human rights 
and cultural particularism.11 
The resistances of non-Western countries 
ensued, for example in fierce debates went 
along with the UDHR declaration in 1948.12 The 
socialist countries’ criticism mainly concerned 
the concept of the UDHR which they accused of 
venerating the individualism rights, while the 
Muslim countries’ objections primarily aimed at 
the liberalistic and individualistic tendencies in 
the human rights.13 Various objections and 
criticisms of the universalism claims of human 
rights and the inconsistencies of Western 
countries’ practice in implementing the rights 
are ongoing right now. 
The whole criticism of the universalism 
claim had led to dialectical processes 
contributed productively to human rights 
discourse. International views and perceptions 
generally began to shift; they no longer 
regarded human rights as a product of certain 
cultural groups, i.e. Western cultures, but rather 
a product of interculturalism.14 At the same 
                                                 
 11Kelsay and Twiss, Agama, 59-60.  
 12There were four groups of the countries. Firstly, the 
Western countries, both geographically and geopolitically, 
such as the US, France, Britain and Australia. Secondly, the 
Latin American countries tended to be in line with Western 
groups. Thirdly, the European socialist countries led by the 
Soviet Union which fiercely opposed Western human 
rights theses. Fourthly, Asian countries, especially Muslim 
countries led by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan propounded a 
number of objections concerning religions, specifically the 
religious freedom issues. See Cassese, Hak Asasi, 40-1.  
 13The socialist countries’ objections against the UDHR 
were accommodated by the UN with the ICESCR. See 
"International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights," accessed March 5, 2020, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/International_Covenant_on_Economic,_Social_and_Cultur
al_Rights. Meanwhile, Muslim countries of the OIC 
responded to the UDHR by declaring an Islamic version of 
human rights instruments, namely the Cairo Declaration 
on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI). See "Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam," accessed March 6, 
2020, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cairo_Declaration_on_ 
Human_Rights_in_Islam.  
 14Cassese, Hak Asasi, 89-90. 
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time, the UN stressed to strengthen 
understanding of human rights and its 
implementation between Western and non-
Western countries; First, to understand that 
there are various types of human rights, not 
only civil and political rights, but also economic, 
social and cultural rights. Likewise, human 
rights do not only include individual rights, but 
also the collective rights of society (indivisibility 
principle); Second, based on the principle, an 
evaluation of the implementation of human 
rights in a country by external parties (other 
countries) is not at all justified; Third, an 
equilibrium between individual rights and 
community rights or between rights and 
obligations urgently needed; Fourth, although 
the notion of human rights are universal, its 
implementations are bound by its contexts such 
as norms, history, culture, socio-political system, 
and the level of economic growth.15  
The common understanding initiated by the 
UN had more or less created a conducive 
situation to srengthen awareness of human 
rights.16 Many of the objections also proposed 
formulations from non-Western countries 
greatly affected the international human rights 
covenants and treaties, such as the ICCPR and 
ICESCR. Two covenants are evidences that 
human rights are no longer a homogeneous 
cultural product.17 The productive symbiosis 
between Western and non-Western perspectives 
had enriched the human rights discourse.18 
However, that does not mean that the problem 
between universalism claim of human rights 
                                                 
 15Lili Romli, “Masalah Hak Asasi Manusia di 
Indonesia,” Majalah Forum Ilmiah UNIJA, vol. III, no. 1 
(May 1999): 10-16. 
 16Kelsay and Twiss, Agama, 76-80.    
 17Kelsay and Twiss, Agama, 58-9.   
 18Many religious leaders and interfaith commissions 
voiced the philosophical human rights ideas accepted in 
various world traditions and also expressed supports for 
human rights in their own traditional language. For 
example, Parliament of the World’s Religions on 4 
September 1993 in Chicago. See "Declaration Towards a 
Global Ethic," accessed March 6, 2020, 
http://www.parliamentofreligions. 
org/_includes/FCKcontent/File/Towards AGlobalEthic.pdf   
and particularism claim of cultures was over. To 
some extent, the problem still emerged until 
now. One of the most controversial human 
rights issues is the right to freedom of religion 
and belief called UDHR Article 18. In Muslim 
countries, the idea of religious freedom becomes 
one of the most controversial human rights 
issues to this day. Therefore, it is one of the 
biggest challenges to the strengthening of 
human rights in Muslim societies.19 
The objections and resistances of Islamic 
world, especially on the religious freedom 
issues, had led to a number of formulations or 
"counter" human rights instruments claimed to 
represent Islamic teachings. Two documents of 
human rights  in Islamic version, the Universal 
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) 
in 1981 and the Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam (CDHRI) in 1990, were concrete 
manifestations of the Islamic world’s efforts to 
fight against the international human rights 
regime. The documents further reflected the 
controversies of human rights issues in Islamic 
world, especially the religious freedom issues.  
 
Resistance of Islamic World 
In the international context, the discourse 
on religious freedom mainly refers to the two 
international human rights instruments issued 
by the UN as major international provisions, 
namely the UDHR and ICCPR.20 For all UN 
member states, the two instruments are morally 
binding even though not legally binding. UDHR 
becomes a general reference in guaranteeing the 
protection and fulfillment of human rights, 
while ICCPR emphasized the UDHR’s human 
rights principles can be effective and legally 
                                                 
 19The other controversial human rights issues in the 
Islamic world are slavery, women's rights, non-Muslim 
socio-political status, discrimination against religious 
minorities, and physical sanctions such as rajam and 
decapitation. They had led to accusations that Islam is 
uncompatible with human rights. See Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Na‘im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, 
Human Rights, and International Law (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990), 172-7.  
 20An-Na‘im, Toward, 871-3; Zen, “Berkenalan,” 16-33.     
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binding. Therefore, the countries ratified ICCPR 
are legally bound by it; they become State 
Parties obliged protecting, respecting, and 
fulfilling all forms of human rights in the 
covenant.21 
Indonesia as a member of the UN had 
accommodated the UDHR’s spirit regarding the 
recognition and protection of human rights in 
general and the right to religious freedom in 
particular through promulgation in the 
amendment of the Constitution 1945 (the human 
rights section, Article 28E Verse [1], [2] and [3]; 
and religion section Article 29 Verse [2]) and 
Human Rights Act Number 39/1999 (Article 4 
and 22 Verse [1] and [2]). Indonesia had also 
ratified ICCPR through Ratification Act of the 
ICCPR Number 12 of 2005.22 Thus, Indonesia is 
morally bound to UDHR as well as legally 
(entry into force) with ICCPR. 
The relationship between UDHR and 
ICCPR is indeed close. UDHR’s guarantee for 
the religious freedom is main basis for its 
formulation in the ICCPR. Article 18 Verse (1) 
The ICCPR in general follows the arrangements 
affirmed in Article 18 of UDHR. In Article 18 
Verse (1) of the ICCPR there are three types of 
guaranteed and protected human rights, namely 
freedom of thought, religion, and belief. The 
three as confirmed in Article 4 Verse (2) of the 
covenant are recognized as non-derogable 
rights. Through this article, ICCPR recognizes 
freedom of belief as a type of human rights 
which is equal to the freedom of religion and 
freedom of thought. 
Based on the UDHR and ICCPR, the 
religious freedom clearly includes the right to 
freedom of religion as well as belief. It includes 
not only the right to embrace and practice a 
religion or belief, but also the right to change a 
                                                 
 21See Article 1 Verse (3) and Article 2 Verse (1), (2), 
and (3) ICCPR.   
 22Indonesia was the 161st country of 192 UN member 
countries ratified ICCPR. See "Evaluation of Human Rights 
Enforcement," accessed March 5, 2020, 
http://www.kontras.org/data/evaluasi%20penegakan%20h
am % 202008.pdf. 
religion or a belief.23 Based on the eight norms of 
religious freedom emerged in the international 
human rights discourse,24 it is one type of 
human rights that cannot be reduced or 
suspended by anyone and in any situation (non-
derogable rights). It is a absolute form of inner 
freedom (freedom to be)25 and is therefore a 
hard core of human rights.26 Meanwhile, the 
right to express religion, such as the right to 
worship, to establish houses of worship, and to 
spread religion categorized as the freedom to 
act) and therefore can be limitable, regulable, 
and derogable.27 
The right to freedom of religion is one of 
basic human rights such as the right to live, free 
from hunger, right to residence, free from 
torture, and the right to obtain health services.28 
The basic human rights are claimed to be 
universal by the internasional human rights 
regime. This universalism claim was 
immediately rejected by the Islamic world, 
precisely by Muslim countries. The rejection 
mainly focused on the imposition of religious 
                                                 
 23Ismail Hasani, Negara Harus Bersikap: Realitas Legal 
Diskriminatif dan Impunitas Praktik Persekusi Masyarakat atas 
Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan (Jakarta: SETARA 
Institute, 2009), 6. 
 24The eight norms are (1) internal freedom, (2) 
external freedom, (3) noncoercion, (4) nondiscrimination, 
(5) rights of parents and guardians, (6) corporate freedom 
and legal status, (7) limits of permissible restrictions on 
external freedom, and (8) non-derogability. See Tore 
Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, Jr., Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie, and 
Nazila Ghanea, “Introduction,” in Facilitating Freedom of 
Religion or Belief: A Deskbook, eds. Tore Lindholm, W. Cole 
Durham, Jr., and Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie (Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004): xxxvii-ix.   
 25Dermot Groome, The Handbook of Human Rights 
Investigation (Massachusetts: Human Rights Press, 2001), 6.  
 26H. Victor Conde, A Handbook of International Human 
Rights Terminology (London: University of Nebraska Press, 
1999), 26.  
 27Manfred Nowak and Tanja Vospernik, “Permissible 
Restrictions on Freedom of Religion or Belief,” in 
Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook, eds. 
Tore Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, Jr., and Bahia G. Tahzib-
Lie (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004): 
147-72. 
 28Conde, A Handbook, 11; Ahmad al-Rashīdī, Huqūq al-
Insān: Dirāsah Muqāranah fī al-Nazhariyah wa al-Tathbīq 
(Cairo: Maktabah al-Shurūq al-Dawliyah, 2003), 135-53. 
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freedom to include the right of freedom to 
change religion or belief (Article 18 of UDHR). 
Thus, the rejected point was not the right to 
freedom of religion in general, but its scope 
which includes the right to change religion or 
belief as part of the right to freedom of religion. 
This issue was one of the controversies as well 
as the main reason for the emergence of two 
Islamic instruments of human rights, namely 
UIDHR and CDHRI. 
UIDHR and CDHRI promulgated a number 
of basic objections to human rights issues in 
UDHR, especially concerning freedom to 
change religion or belief. The essence of the two 
declarations were same in general: Islam did 
accept the principles of human rights, but it had 
its own interpretations and limitations in certain 
matters such as the the religious freedom, 
especially the freedom to convert religion which 
considered contrary to the Islamic doctrine of 
apostasy (riddah). 
UIDHR was published on September 19, 
1981 in Paris. The formulation was developed 
from the Islamic conceptualization of human 
rights entitled Universal Islamic Declaration 
(UID) which had been previously declared 
through the International Conference on the 
Prophet Muhammad and His Message on April 
12-15, 1980 in London. UIDHR accommodated 
23 types of Islamic human rights29 were initiated 
by a number of Muslim jurists and intellectuals 
from Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other 
Muslim countries. The forum was facilitated by 
the Islamic Council, a non-governmental 
organization based in London and affiliated 
with the Muslim World League based in Saudi 
Arabia which tended to represent the interests 
of conservative Muslims.30 
                                                 
 29See “Universal Islamic Declaration of Human 
Rights,” accessed March 7, 2020, http://www.alhewar.com/ 
ISLAMDECL. html.  
 30Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: 
Tradition and Politics (Colorado: Westview Press, 2006), 21. 
In the contemporary era, conservative Islamic views are 
ideologically represented by the Islamists. See 
Mulawarwan Hannase, “Islamist Ideology and Its Effect on 
the Global Conflict: Comparative Study between Hams 
Meanwhile, the CDHRI consisting of 25 
Articles31 was declared in Cairo on August 5, 
1990. Signed by representatives of 54 member 
states of the OIC, it had a more "official" status 
than UIDHR. At least in the Islamic world, 
precisely within the OIC member states, CDHRI 
was more morally binding than UIDHR; it was 
an Islamic scheme of human rights claimed as 
the consensus of Muslims worldwide.32 
However, in the context of international human 
rights, that claim did not necessarily make it 
able to shift the international human rights 
regime represented by the UDHR and ICCPR. It 
had relatively no social relevance and political 
significance in many Muslim countries such as 
Indonesia which ratified the UDHR and ICCPR 
as "The International Bill of Human Rights". 
The entire contents of the CDHRI and 
UIDHR in general indeed reflected the 
conservative views of the Islamic world before 
the UDHR and ICCPR which considered 
contrary to Islamic teachings. Both of them also 
played the element of exclusivism because all of 
their conceptualizations based on the Sharī'ah so 
that they automatically reinforced the idea of 
particularism.33 The particularism spirit also was 
manifest in their conceptualization of the right 
to freedom of religion or belief; both ignored 
and/or refused to include riddah as part of the 
right to freedom of religion or belief. 
By placing Sharī'ah as the sole reference for 
every explanation and clarification, CDHRI and 
UIDHR had the interest of protecting a number 
of Islamic doctrines, such as allowing rajam 
                                                                                
and ISIS,” ESENSIA, vol. 20, no. 2 (October 2019): 183-97,  
http://ejournal.uin-
suka.ac.id/ushuluddin/esensia/article/view/2107  
 31See “Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam”, 
accessed March 7, 2020, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
instree/ cairodeclaration.html.  
 32Mayer, Islam, 22.  
 33CDHRI was based on the Sharī‘ah (Article 24) 
confirmed as a single reference (Article 25). UIDHR also 
chose to base itself on the Qur'ān and al-Hadith; in the 
document there was no a article that explicitly mentioned 
the Sharī‘ah as the sole reference, but in the Explanatory 
Notes section (item 1.b) it explicitly stated that the 
UIDHR’s articles based on the Sharī‘ah. 
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sanction, prohibiting ribā, giving unequal warīth 
rights between men and women, differentiating 
Muslim and non-Muslim status, prohibiting 
interfaith marriages, and forbiding riddah. That 
is why both are often criticized as unneutral 
because they prioritized a particular religion, 
Islam, as the moral and legal standard of the 
human rights. Therefore both of them are 
inadequate to be called universal, but particular, 
for the context of Muslims only;34 even this 
context is debatable because Muslims divided 
into many variants of schools, ideologies, and 
thoughts.  
CDHRI and UIDHR were also accused of 
failing to guarantee and fulfill the right to 
religious freedom. Both of them declared 
freedom of religion, but not in the sense to 
include freedom of apostasy. UIDHR mentioned 
the right to freedom of religion in Article 13 
(Every person has the right to freedom of conscience 
and worship in accordance with his religious beliefs) 
and Article 10a (The Qur'anic principle “There is 
no compulsion in religion” shall govern the religious 
rights of non-Muslim minorities). Meanwhile, 
CDHRI accommodated the religious freedoms 
in Article 10 (… It is prohibited to exercise any form 
of pressure on man or to exploit his poverty or 
ignorance in order to force him to change his religion 
to another religion or to atheism). It used the sense 
in prohibiting to force or exploiting the poverty 
and ignorance of people to invite them to 
change religion or convert to atheism (Article 
10). The articles indeed supported the religious 
freedom and rejected the compulsion in religion. 
However, that clearly did not answer the 
problem regarding people who changed religion 
without compulsion. It is not clear whether it is 
prohibited or permitted; both only forbade the 
compulsion in apostasy. 
The UIDHR and CDHRI refused apostasy 
as part of the religious freedom. Both of them 
did not explicitly mention the prohibition to 
change religion. However, by not mentioning 
the apostasy as a scope of the notion of religious 
                                                 
 34Ibn Warraq, “Apostasy and Human Rights,” 
accessed May 3, 2020, http://www.iheu.org/node/1541.  
freedom, it is clearly ambiguous and 
inconsistent because apostasy is an inherent part 
of recognition of the religious freedom.35 Based 
on these premises, that is why UIDHR and 
CDHRI allegedly failed to provide protection of 
rights on religious freedom. The logic is simple, 
how is it possible recognizing religious freedom, 
while forbidding people to change their 
religion? Isn't it ambiguous, freedom of dress, 
while punishing people switched to wear 
clothes with a certain model and color? 
The serious differences between the Islamic 
version of human rights (UIDHR and CDHRI) 
and the Western version of human rights 
(UDHR and ICCPR) did not lie in the idea of 
religious freedom in general, but in the apostasy 
issues—whether it was part of religious freedom 
or not. Moreover, the difference lied in the 
potential of the UIDHR and CDHRI’s religious 
freedom schemes to delegitimize the freedom of 
thought regarding religious interpretations, a 
part of the religious freedom. This is related to 
the fact that both instruments put the Sharī'ah as 
the sole reference in interpreting human rights 
in which the freedom of thought must be 
subserted to the Sharī'ah. 
UIDHR and CDHRI clearly emphasized 
Sharī’ah as a sole reference for every 
interpretation and that's the problem. In each of 
their dialogues with the Sharī'ah, Muslims are 
impossible apart from their own prejudices and 
historical situatedness.36 Meanwhile the 
tradition of interpretation in Islam is always 
interconnected with interests of the religious 
authorities. As a result, the apostasy was not 
tolerated; the various religious thoughts that 
considered "deviant" from the mainstream 
religious interpretations could be immediately 
accused of heresy.37 
                                                 
 35Mayer, Islam, 21, 160-2, 172-3.   
 36This thesis referred to Gadamer’s hermeneutical 
perspective. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 
trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: 
Crossroad Publishing Co., 1975), 276, 283. 
 37For exampel the case of Nashr Hamīd Abū Zayd, an 
Egyptian muslim thinker, who accused of apostate for 
criticizing the Islamic orthodoxy and the case of Mahmoud 
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The serious differences had become the 
main problem for strengthening human rights 
in the Islamic world. On the one hand, it was the 
reason for the Muslims to emphasize that 
Islamic teachings are indeed different from 
Western traditions and are incompatible with 
human rights. On the other hand, there are a 
number of Muslim intellectuals acknowledged 
the religious freedom in the international 
human rights is actually in line with the 
universal message of Islam and therefore Islam 
is always compatible with human rights. This 
fact reflected that the concept of religious 
freedom in Islam had never been singular 
meaning; there are many perspectives, so there 
is a lot of debate going on from then until now. 
 
Reconceptualization of the Meaning 
The compatibility issue between Islam and 
human rights is one of the controversial issues 
in contemporary studies of Islam and human 
rights. A number of Muslim intellectuals had 
tried to analyse it with various approaches to 
harmonize the two. For example, Abdullahi 
Ahmed al-Na‘im who advocated an adequate 
reform methodology38 and Mashood A. Baderin 
who proposed a methodical approach called 
complementary approach that combined the 
traditional interpretation of Sharī’ah with the 
exclusionist interpretations of international 
human rights.39 In that context, this paper 
proposed a reconceptualization of religious 
freedom in order to mediate the serious 
differences between Islam and human rights. 
Islam actually acknowledged the right to 
religious freedom (ḥurriyah al-adyān; al-ḥurriyah 
al-dīniyyah). A number of verses of the Qur'an 
confirmed it, for example Qs. al-Baqarah (2): 256 
                                                                                
Mohamed Taha, a Sudanese Muslim reformer, executed by 
President Ja'far Numayry's regime on January 18, 1985 
because of his reform ideas. For the Taha’s case, see 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, "Translator's Introduction," 
in Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, The Second Message of Islam 
(New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 2-10. 
 38An-Na’im, Toward, 34-68. 
 39Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and 
Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 219-35. 
which promulgated that Islam refuses all kinds 
of coercion in religion, even to embrace Islam. 
For Islam, the assertion that the right path is 
different from the wrong path is enough; 
furthermore, everyone has the freedom to 
choose to be a believer or not.40 
The spirit was also confirmed by Qs. Yūnus 
(10): 99-100. This verse said that it is actually 
easy for Allah SWT to make all humans to be 
believers, but He did not make it because He 
did not want coercions in religious matters.41 He 
also asserted that to be mu’min or kāfir is His 
business and that is very dependent on His will. 
The spirit is closely related to the tolerance 
as well as the freedom of choice as confirmed by 
Qs. al-Kahfi (18): 29. That verse said, "... 
Whoever wills—let him believe and whoever 
wills—let him disbelieve". This phrase is truly 
extraordinary; believing or denying the Islam or 
other religions or even not having a religion is a 
choice. There is no compulsion in religion. 
Therefore, Allah SWT limited the Prophet 
Muhammad’s role as merely a reminder (Qs. al-
Ghāshiyah [88]: 21). In the continuation of verse 
(22) it was emphasized that although he is the 
God’s messanger, he is not the one has power 
over all mankind, but God has. 
Furthermore, Allah Almighty declared in 
Qs. al-Shūrā (42): 48 that he did not send the 
Prophet Muhammad to act as watchdog over 
humans. "Your duty is only to deliver (the 
                                                 
 40This verse was related to the story of a woman 
promised that if she was blessed with a child, she would 
make him/her a Jew and would not allow him/her to adopt 
another religion. This verse came down as a form of 
rejection of all coercions in religious matters. See 
Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Hakīm al-Shahīr 
bi Tafsīr al-Manār, Juz III (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), 35-6. 
The other story was also referred as sabab al-nuzūl of the 
verse; an Anshār, al-Hushaynī, had two Christian sons. He 
requested permission from the Prophet Muhammad SAW 
to force them to embrace Islam and then the verse came 
down. See Abū al-Fidā 'Ismā'īl ibn Kathīr al-Qurashiyyi al-
Dimashqī, Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azhīm, Juz I (Cairo: Dār al-
Mishr li al-Ṭibā'ah, n.d.), 310-1.  
 41In Qs. al-Mā'idah (5): 48, Allah SWT emphasized 
that diversity is intentionally created by Him to test the 
humans and encouraged them to compete for virtue. See 
also Qs. al-Nahl (16): 93.   
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message; risālah)," he said in the verse. In Qs. 
Qāf (50): 45 it even said that the Prophet "... is 
not there to compel them to believe". The 
Prophet is strictly merely a conveyor of the 
truth.42 He is not a presenter of the hidāyah;43 The 
only Allah SWT authorized to give it. The spirit 
of all these verses is a fundamental reason for 
being tolerant of those apostates (murtad). 
Allah SWT affirmed the tolerance in 
responding to the differences in religious 
choices, e.g. in Qs. al-Kāfirūn (109): 6, "To you 
be your religion, and to me mine".44 This verse 
indirectly outlined that religious matters are 
personal matters. It cannot be exchanged, 
negotiated, intervened, or forced. It is a belief 
entity occupied the one’s heart so that only 
Allah knows the true of one's faith. Each person 
will be held accountable for their respective 
faiths before Allah Almighty later. Thus it was 
hinted by Allah in Qs. Yūnus (10): 41.45 So, the 
tolerance always becomes a necessary thing in 
the dynamics of religious plurality.46 
In the framework of tolerance, Muslims are 
also forbidden to hate, insult, and persecute 
others because of different choices in religions 
or beliefs. This message referred to Qs. al-An‘ām 
(6): 108.47 This verse reminded Muslims not to 
                                                 
 42See Qs. al-Furqān (25): 56; Qs. Hūd (11): 12; Qs. al-
Mā’idah (5): 99; and Qs. al-Ra‘d (13): 40.  
 43Qs. al-Qaṣaṣ (28): 56.  
 44This verse responded the Quraysh offered the 
Prophet to worship their Lord a year and vice versa they 
were willing to worship the Prophet's God for a year. They 
were also willing to follow the Islamic teachings if the 
Prophet’s God is better and instead they demanded the 
Prophet to follow their beliefs if their God is better. See 
Abū Ja'far Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī: 
Al-Musammā Jāmi‘ 'al-Bayān fī Ta'wīl al-Qur'ān, Volume XII 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 1992), 727-8; Ibn Kathīr, 
Tafsīr, Juz IV, 560-1. 
 45Qs. al-Baqarah (2): 139; Qs. al- Qaṣaṣ (28): 55; and 
Qs. al-Shūrā (42): 15.  
 46Umma Farida, “Religious Tolerance in the Quran 
and Sunnah and the Importance of Its Application in 
Indonesia,” ESENSIA, vol. 20, no. 1 (April 2019): 95-117, 
http://ejournal.uin-
suka.ac.id/ushuluddin/esensia/article/view/1747 
 47See also Qs. al-Hujurāt (49): 11. This verse is very 
relevant to respond the conflict of beliefs within the 
Muslims. It emphasized the prohibition of insulting each 
insult the others’ religion, such as cursing the 
others’ God, so that others did not do the same 
thing—or even exceed the limits—to Islam.48 
This is a affirmation that every religion or belief 
must be protected; differences in religion or 
belief should not be a reason for the believers to 
negate each other. 
Islam refused all acts of coercion in 
religious matters and highly upheld the 
principle of religious freedom. Allah had 
reminded the Prophet Muhammad that he was 
sent only as a messenger brought warnings and 
good tidings.49 The emphasis of risālah (Islamic 
messages) is the invitation without coercions 
and methods of violence.50 In that case, Islam 
substantively had shown its commitment to the 
principles of religious freedom and the human 
rights principles in general rather than the 
international human rights instruments that 
emerged in the recent past such as the UDHR 
and ICCPR. 
All the textual-normative affirmations of al-
Qur’ān did not necessarily make the Islamic 
discourse of religious freedom without debates. 
The controversies arose, especially in the 
matters of apostasy. The apostasy issues tended 
to be ignored in the Islamic creed of religious 
freedom. In many cases, this issue was indeed a 
biggest obstacle to reconcile Islam with human 
rights. 
The discourse of apostasy had caused 
controversy not only in Islam, but also in almost 
all religions such as Judaism and Christianity. In 
the Christian and Jewish traditions, the term of 
apostasy or conversion was known, which 
meant to change one’s religion or belief.51 The 
term actually referred to a strong desire to 
escape from sin as well as to draw closer to God 
through strengthening faith. However, this term 
                                                                                
other because the only God knows which is better or truer 
among them.  
 48Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, Juz II, 167-8.   
 49Qs. al-Furqān (25): 56.    
 50Qs. al-Nahl (16): 125. 
 51Robert B. Costello (editor in chief), et.al., Random 
House Webster's College Dictionary (New York: Random 
House Inc., 1991), 298.   
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is later commonly associated with apostasy.52 
The apostasy means rejecting a religion and 
then leaving it to enter another religion or not at 
all.53 
In Islam, the discourse of apostasy or riddah 
appeared in a number of Quranic verses with 
two categories, namely irtidād (returning to its 
original state; retreating) and al-kufr ba‘d al-īmān 
(returning infidels after believing).54 The two 
verses directly (lafzhīyah) mentioned riddah are 
Qs. al-Baqarah (2): 217 and Qs. al-Mā'idah (5): 
54.55 In the first verse, Allah SWT asserted that 
all good deeds of apostates who later died in 
disbelief are worthless and they will inhabit the 
hell forever. In the second verse, Allah swt. 
implied a no-worry response to the apostates56 
while announcing that someday He will bring "a 
people whom Allah loves them and they also 
love Him...". 
The spirit of all these verses is to question, 
regret, and even condemn the apostates. 
However, none of these verses ordered the 
death penalty for apostates, except the 
punishment that would befall them in the 
hereafter. The inspiration of the death penalty 
                                                 
 52Ibn Warraq, “Apostasy.”   
 53Nazila Ghanea, "Apostasy and Freedom to Change 
Religion or Belief," in Facilitating, 669-71.  
 54The two categories of apostates are (1) a person who 
denied all the Islamic teachings and then renounced Islam; 
and (2) a person who acknowledged some of the Islamic 
teachings and rejected others. See Abū 'Abd al-Lāh 
Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Anṣārī al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmi‘ li 
Ahkām al-Qur'ān, vol. III, Juz 6 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
'Ilmiyah, 1993), 142; 'Abd al-Qādir 'Awdah, Al-Tashrī 'al-
Jinā'iy al-Islāmī: Muqāranan bi al-Qānūn al-Waḍ'ī (Damascus: 
Muassasah al-Risālah Nāṣirūn, 2005), 877. For etymological 
meanings, see Jamāl al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Makram ibn 
Manzhur al-Afrīqī al-Miṣrī, Lisān al-'Arab, vol. III (Beirut: 
Dār Ṣādir, 1990), 173.      
 55The verses which indirectly mentioned riddah 
spread in al-Qur’ān, such as Qs. al-Nisā '(4): 137 which said 
that Allah SWT will not forgive “those who believe, then 
disbelieve, then believe, then disbelieve, then increase in 
disbelief”. See also Qs. al-Nisā’ (4): 89; Qs. Ali ‘Imrān (3): 
72, 86-90, 106, 177; Qs. al-Tawbah (9): 66, 74; Qs. al-Hajj 
(22): 11; Qs. Muhammad (47): 25; and Qs. al-Nahl (16): 106. 
 56In Qs. Ali ‘Imrān (3): 177 it is even stated that those 
apostates will absolutely not be able to give maḍarrah 
(disadvantage) to Allah SWT. 
for apostates in classical or conservative Islamic 
thought was indeed not drawn from al-Qur'ān, 
but the hadith. There are at least two hadith 
which directly affirmed the death penalty for 
apostates.57 First, the hadith narrated by al-
Bukhārī ra. concerning the “halal blood” of a 
Muslim who apostatized and separated himself 
from the Muslim community (al-tārik li dīnihi, al-
mufāriq li al-jamā‘ah). According to the hadīts, in 
addition to murderers and adulterers (muḥṣan), 
apostates who leaved their community are 
authorized to be killed.58 Second, the other 
hadith narrated by al-Bukhārī ra. announced 
that "whosoever changes his religion, then kill 
him" (man baddala dīnahu faqtulūhu).59 This 
hadith was revealed by Ibn ‘Abbās as a reaction 
to the action of ‘Alī ibn Abī Thālib kw. which 
burned the zindīq people. According to Ibn 
‘Abbās, quoting the Prophet, it was forbidden to 
punish with Allah’s punishment, viz. to burn; 
they should be executed because that is the right 
punishment for apostates.60 
Both hadiths are literally controversial to 
the concept of religious freedom in Islam; 
whether apostasy is part of the Islamic version 
of religious freedom or not. The point of 
controversy is not only regarding the death 
penalty for the apostates, but also concerning 
the relevance of the two hadiths as a reason to 
affirm the thesis that Islam guaranteed the right 
to religious freedom, except the right to 
                                                 
 57In addition to the two hadiths, there are a number of 
other hadiths, for example about (1) inviting the apostates 
to repent, if they deny, we have to hit their nape; see 
Ahmad ibn ‘Alī ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalānī, Fath al-Bārī bi Sharh 
Ṣahīh al-Bukhārī, vol. XII (T.tp: al-Maktabah al-Salafiyah, 
n.d.), 272; and (2) the case of apostates from the ‘Ukuls. 
They apostatized after seizing camels and killing their 
guards who had given them camels’ milk and urine to cure 
their pain. The Prophet punished them by cutting off their 
arms and legs and prying their eyes and leaving them to 
die. See Abū al-‘Abbās Shahāb al-Dīn Ahmad al-Qisṭalānī, 
Irshād al-Sārī li Sharh Ṣahīh al-Bukhārī, vol. XIV (Beirut: Dār 
al-Fikr, 1990), 245.  
 58See Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Jarīmah al-Riddah... wa 
‘Uqūbah al-Murtad fī Ḍaw’i al-Qur’ān wa al-Sunnah (Cairo: 
Maktabah Wahbah, 1996), 47.  
 59al-Qisṭalānī, Irshād, 395-6. 
 60al-Qisṭalānī, Irshād, 395-6. 
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apostatize (the conversion from Islam to another 
religion, not vice versa). 
Both hadiths were commonly held by 
conservative Muslims as a basis for the 
implementation of the death penalty for 
apostates while categorizing the riddah in 
jarīmah ḥudūd (criminal offense).61 They ignored 
the fact that the validity level of hadith “man 
baddala dīnahu faqtulūhu” is actually āḥād,62 not 
mutawātir. Some Islamic scholars assessed this 
hadith has a weakness (shudhūdh) on one of 
rāwīs.63 The fact reduced its level of validity and 
therefore it was weak to be the basis for the 
implementation of death penalty for the 
apostates. 
Regardless of the controversy about the 
level of validity (ṣaḥīḥ), these hadiths and others 
must be placed in the context of place, time, and 
socio-political situation when the hadiths arose. 
The hadiths promulagated the death penalty for 
apostates were closely related to the socio-
political context of Muslims in formative period 
when the quantity and social solidarity of 
                                                 
 61‘Awdah, Al-Tashrī‘, 885; Ibn Warraq, “Apostasy.” 
 62The status of hadith āhād as hujjah was indeed 
debatable among Islamic scholars. Some of them obliged to 
use it as hujjah, the others argued that it was a unobligatory 
because its dalālah is zhannī so that it can be ignored. See 
Muhammad 'Alī ibn Muhammad al-Shawkānī, Irshād al-
Fuhūl ilā Tahqīq al-Haqq min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 
n.d.), 48. If a hadith āhād is contrary to the universal 
message (kulliyah; qaṭ'ī) of al-Qur'ān, it cannot invalidate 
the universal law of al-Qur'ān; in this context, the idea of 
religious freedom is the universal message of al-Qur'an, 
whereas the death penalty of apostates is a particular 
message (juz'iyah; zhannī) of the hadith āhād. Meanwhile, 
the meaning of qaṭ‘ī and zhannī in the discourse of uṣūl al-
fiqh involved two different things, namely al-thubūt 
(originality of source) and al-dalālah (content of meaning). 
Al-Qur'an had qaṭ‘īy al-thubūt that it really came from Allah 
SWT. See ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, ‘Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Cairo: 
Dār al-Qalam li al-Naṣr wa al-Tawzī, 1990), 34-5. On the 
other hand, the hadith—especially those with the status of 
āhād—had zhannīy al-thubūt because most could not be 
ascertained to have truly originated from the Prophet. See 
Khallāf, ‘Ilm Uṣūl, 42-3. 
 63‘Ikrimah ibn Khālid ibn al-‘Ash and Muhammad ibn 
al-Faḍl al-Sadūsī were two rāwīs whose personal integrity 
and rote quality doubted. See Ahmad ibn ‘Alī ibn Hajar al-
‘Asqalānī, Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb, Juz VII (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-‘Ilmiyah, 1994), 223-4 and Juz IX, 347-9. 
Muslims were very significant to the da‘wah 
islāmiyah and the political strengthening of the 
Ummah. During the formative period, Muslims 
were in a war against the infidels. The apostates 
often not only apostatized from Islam, but also 
provoked social chaos; they broke away from 
the jamā‘ah while conspiring with the infidels to 
attack Muslims. 
Provoking social chaos as a reason for 
enforcing the death penalty was revealed in the 
hadith about the case of  apostates from the 
‘Ukuls then seized camels and killed the 
guards.64 Meanwhile, for the cases of riddah 
followed by betrayal, it was reflected through 
the hadith regarding the act of riddah which was 
followed by the act of opposing the Muslims. In 
these cases, the imposition of death penalty for 
apostates had theological relevance as well as 
social significance at that time, namely related to 
the need for the solidity of the ummah in the war 
situation.65 
The death penalty for apostates was 
imposed because of their betrayal and/or 
conspiracies with the infidels, not just because 
of apostasy. The Prophet Muhammad SAW had 
never sentenced a person to death who simply 
apostized—not followed by the enmities; it was 
implicitly revealed in the hadith about the riddah 
case of a Bedouin Arab. The hadith narrated that 
the Bedouin had a high fever after embracing 
Islam. He then met the Prophet and declared 
out of Islam. The Prophet did not condemn him 
to death and then let him go.66 Thus apostasy or 
disbelief did not justify the death penalty, unless 
accompanied by the acts of betrayal and enmity 
towards Muslims.67 Therefore, the apostasy in 
                                                 
 64See note 57.  
 65For the historical socio-political background of the 
riddah, see Elias Shoufani, Al-Riddah and The Muslim 
Conquest of Arabia (Toronto: The Arab Institute for Research 
Publishing, 1973), 10-47.   
 66Muhammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, Ṣahīh al-Bukhārī, 
Juz VIII (t.tp.: Dār al-Fikr, 1981), 98-9. 
 67See explanation of hudūd sanctions and their 
differences with qiṣāṣ in Mahmūd Shaltūt, Al-Islām: ‘Aqīdah 
wa Sharī‘ah (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2001), 288-91.  
The Religious Freedom: Universalism Claim, Resistance of Islamic World, and Reconceptualization 
130 | , Vol. 21, No. 2, October 2020  
Islam is not enough to be defined only by the 
term “apostate”, but also “renegade”. 
Under peaceful conditions, especially when 
the Muslims are majority like in Indonesia 
today, there is no reason to implement the death 
penalty for apostates. The current socio-political 
context of the Muslims in Indonesia obviously 
does not allow the same legal treatmen for 
apostates; the current context differs from the 
Muslims in the formative era. This difference in 
context and disparity in legal consequences 
should be considered when interpreting the 
Qur’anic messages, for example, in Qs. al-Nisā 
'(4): 89 contained the command to kill the 
infidels wherever Muslims meet them and Qs. 
al-Tawbah (9): 29 affirmed the instruction to 
fight against the unbelievers. 
The same perspective must also be applied 
in responding to the facts about different 
religious interpretations, differences in beliefs, 
and religious sects within the Muslims society; 
this becomes one of the crucial issues in the 
discourse of religious freedom in addition to the 
apostasy issue. Based on Article 18 of the UDHR 
and ICCPR as well as Article 28E Paragraph (2) 
of the 1945 Amendment, understanding and 
interpreting the religious teachings and then 
expressing them in the public and private 
sphere is an inherent part of the religious 
freedom.  
In that context, differences in 
understanding and disparities in beliefs 
between the Muslims are thelogically common 
realities. Those are not a blasphemy of religion. 
Disparity in truth claims should not be a reason 
for negating, blaming, insulting, and mocking 
each other (Qs. al-Hujurat [49]: 11). For this 
reason, being tolerant and fair, unsupportive of 
hatred, and avoiding violences is the 
indispensable spirits in the various truth claims 
among Islamic groups. Each group has an equal 
status so that none can be used as a parameter 
for assessing others; the only Allah who has the 
right to judge them in the hereafter (Qs. al-
Sajdah [32]: 25; Qs. al-Nahl (16): 92). This 
awareness theologically drove every religious 
adherent to always take the path of moderation 
in addressing differences in order to avoid 
radicalism and religious intolerances.68 
Finally, the reactualization of Islamic 
teachings in accordance with the current social 
context becomes necessary because Islam did 
not emerge in culturally vacuum situations; 
Islam was the result of Allah's dialogical 
relationship with all realities of the Arab-Hijaz 
when it emerged early times. Therefore, 
understanding the "contradictory" facts between 
the Quranic spirit emphasized religious freedom 
and the hadiths which actually reinforced the 
death penalty for apostates must be placed in 
the ever-changing dynamics of socio-political-
cultural contexts. In these contexts, the hadiths 
must be seen as the Prophet’s wisdom in 
strengthening Muslim society in that era. 
Furthemore, the death penalty must be 
understood in the Prophet’s role context as an 
God’s messenger or mufti or judge or a political 
leader; his policies direction may differ due to 
differences in the socio-political-cultural context 
of the Muslims.69 
The reactualization of Islamic teachings 
requires the involvement of contextual 
interpretation paradigms. These paradigms put 
realities or contexts as the main projection of 
interpretations; the involvement efforts will 
make Islam always be relevant in all times and 
places (ṣālih li kulli zamān wa makān). On the 
contrary, the old paradigm of interpretations 
oriented to the texts and subordinated the 
contexts will only make Islam and Muslims 
alienated in the changing contemporary social 
dynamics, including in human rights issues. 
 
                                                 
 68Arifinsyah, et.al., “The Urgency of Religious 
Moderation in Preventing Radicalism in Indonesia,” 
ESENSIA, vol. 21, no. 1 (April 2020): 91-107, 
http://ejournal.uin-
suka.ac.id/ushuluddin/esensia/article/view/2199   
 69M. Quraish Shihab, “Wawasan al-Qur’an tentang 
Kebebasan Beragama,” in Passing Over: Melintas Batas 
Agama, eds. Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gaus AF 
(Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001), 187-96. 
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Conclusion 
The universalism claim of human rights as 
a product of Western civilization had triggered 
various problems when implementated to the 
non-Western world, including the Islamic 
countries. All of these problems evoked 
resistances to a wide range of human rights. In 
the context of the Islamic world, this resistances 
brought forth two instruments of human rights 
in Islamic version, namely the UIDHR and 
CDHRI. Both instruments generally reflected a 
conservative Islamic outlook on a number of 
fundamental human rights issues. On the issue 
of religious freedom, the conservative view 
clearly rejected the right to change religion 
(apostasy: riddah). It affirmed the view that the 
apostates must be put to death penalty 
according to the textual message of Islamic 
teachings. This is one of the main issues created 
an image that Islam is antagonistic towards the 
human rights and is therefore considered 
incompatible with it. 
Reconceptualizing the Islamic meaning of 
religious freedom is necessary to reduce the 
resistances of Islamic world and to minimize the 
conservative prejudices in human rights issues. 
The religious freedom in Islam must be 
interpreted progressively as the right to 
freedom of religion or belief and freedom of 
thought. The Islamic concept of religious 
freedom should include the right to embrace 
and practice religion or belief, the right to 
convert religion or belief, and the right to be 
atheist. This reconceptualization of human 
rights issues, specifically the religious freedom 
issue, is not only to mediate the interests of 
cultural particulism, the views of Islamic 
conservatism, and the universalism claim of 
human rights, but also to ensure that Muslims 
are not increasingly alienated amid the 
contemporary social and political dynamics.[] 
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